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Problems Faced by Early Space Transportation Planners
John L. Sloop
Bethesda, Maryland

ABSTRACT

The problems faced by early planners of U.S.
space boosters up to Saturn are described
beginning with early space flight proposals,
extending through the golden age of rocket
technology during the 1950s, and following
the reactions to Soviet space accomplishments. The problems a mixture of sorting
out futuristic conceptions, settling differences over what was technically feasible,
and gaining political and public acceptancecould have their counterparts today.

little attention given to the return trip
until the papers of Sanger and Bredt who
discussed hypervelocity winged vehicles
that returned to earth by skip-glide paths.
(2)

SPACE ACTIVITIES AND ATTITUDES, 1945-49

Although Goddard flew the first liquid
propellant rocket in 1926, the practicality and potential of liquid rockets was not
convincingly demonstrated until the mass
INTRODUCTION
produced German war weapon, the A-4. The
"A 11 series plan extended to A-9, a winged
The solutions to problems of space transvehicle for increasing range by a skipportation depend now, as in the past, on a
glide path. In 1945, the A-4's chief engimelding of what is desired with what is
neer, Wernher von Braun, excited the imagtechnically feasible and what is economination of many with his views on future
ically and politically acceptable. In this
space possibilities including multi-stage
paper, past problems and some solutions in
piloted vehicles orbiting the earth.
'He
space transportation will be discussed by
was the first to speak of practical space
recounting some selected activities up
flight from a position of recognized and
through the 1950s.(1^
impressive rocket accomplishments but even
so, acceptance was limited. The future of
That space transportation is desirable and
rockets beyond A-4 capability received a
feasible has been proclaimed for a long
mixed reception among U.S. Government offitime. Indeed, it is inseparable from any
cials in 1945-46. At one extreme was the
manned space flight proposal, of which there optimism of forward-looking
Gen. H 0 H.Arnold,
were many prior to World War II ranging from chief of the Army
Air Forces who, with the
the frivolous to scientific analyses. The
advice of a group of aeronautical experts
first of the scientific was a paper by
headed by TTieodore von Karman, forecast that
Tsiolkovskiy who in 1903 developed the
strategic bombers would eventually be retheory of rocket flight and described a
placed by long-range ballistic missiles; at
manned rocket using liquid hydrogen-oxygen.
the other extreme was the pessimism of conHe was followed by Goddard, who combined
servative, highly respected Dr. Vannevar
theory with experiment; by Oberth, who exBush, head of the Office of Scientific
panded rocket theory and suggested innoResearch and Development, and Dr. Jerome
vations used today; and by Valier, who was
Hunsaker, chairman of the National Advisory
prolific in ideas for peaceful space exploCommittee for Aeronautics (NACA)., both of
ration. In the late 1920s and early 1930s,
whom saw long-range rocket missiles as
,^
Valier and Tsiolkovskiy independently began
impossible for many years to come, at best."
developing the thesis that the way to the
One of 'the chief reasons for such pessimism,
stars was the gradual increase in the capawas the values of the exhaust velocity and
bility of the airplane from atmospheric to
the ratio of full to empty mass of the A-4.
interplanetary flight. There was, however,
Anyone familiar with the Tsiolkovskiy
V14

equation which relates these to vehicle
velocity could see that appreciable improvements in both would be necessary to increase
its range, and these improvements appeared
hard to achieve. Space enthusiasts might
brush such problems aside but the key people
controlling government purse strings remained unconvinced. In this kind of environment, rocket research and development
proceeded at a relatively slow pace. The
Army showed the most initiative in ballistic
missiles and organized a strong team headed
by von Braun. Mid-level Navy men started a
project for a satellite to be boosted into
orbit by a single stage using hycjrogenoxygen but it never received strong support
at top Navy levels and faded by 1948. '^'
Despite the optimism of Arnold, the Air
Force blew hot and cold on rocket missiles
and satellites. Analyses of satellites and
boosters were conducted by Douglas-Rand in
1945-46 for the Air Force and contracts (the
MX series) were started for missiles in
three ranges up to 8000 kilometers. By the
end of 1946,however, international and
national events resulted in the Air Force
switching emphasis from rocket to airbreathing propulsion, and this was not reversed until the early 1950s.

lubrication. This technology was shelved as
attention turned to more conventional propellants for missiles.
The third activity was vehicle tests by
Convair to obtain better rocket structural
data. Convair engineers, like others, were
greatly hampered by the lack of structural
data beyond the A-4. To fill this need,
Karl Bossart proposed to build and fly ten
test vehicles incorporating some ideas for
reducing, structural or empty mass. The
program began in 1947 but funding was soon
cut and the number of vehicles reduced to
three. These were flown at White Sands
during the latter part of 1948. The vehicles contained three features: very lightweight tanks which were thin-walled and
pressure stabilized, a concept proposed, by
Oberth in the 1920s but independently conceived by Bossart; elimination of the insulation jacket for liquid oxygen to save
weight; and use of swiveling nozzles* first
used by Goddard, to control the pitch and.
yaw of the vehicle. The flight tests were
not an outstanding success but. none of the
problems were caused by the three features,
all of which were incorporated into the
Atlas, the first U.S.ICBM.(6)

To sum up to 1950, there were a number of
proposals for space flight but little
acceptance. Rocket engine performance was
relatively low with durability and reliAmong the R&D activities during the second
ability uncertain. Vehicle empty mass was
half of the 1940s were three that were sigstill relatively high and many improvements
nificant for their later impact on space
were needed to increase range. More flight
transportation. One was the continued
data were needed. In short, there was too
interest in rockets by Rand analysts after
completing initial studies for the Air Force little experience and confidence in rockets
to create much serious interest in space
and during the period of emphasis on airbreathing propulsion. By 1949, when the Air flight. A stronger motivation was needed
Force again asked Rand to examine satellites, and it did not come until the first part of
they had prepared an extensive report on the the 1950s.
potentialities of rockets including longrange ballistic missiles, an important planMISSILE DEVELOPMENT .AND SPACE PROPOSALS
ning step towards the intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) of the 1950s.
SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

The second activity was experiments sponsored by both the Air Force and Navy on liquid
hydrogen-oxygen, conducted at Ohio State
University, Aerojet Corporation, and the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory of the California
of Technology. Although the
'
Institute '
work was done with small rockets and not
carried very far, the results indicated that
high exhaust velocities could be attained,
regenerative cooling with liquid hydrogen
was possible, liquid hydrogen could be pumped, and the pump's ball bearings could run
directly immersed in liquid hydrogen without

Samuel Hoffman, president of North American
Aviation's Rocketdyne division that first
developed, large U.S. rocket engin.es., saw the
first half of the 195 Os as preparation for
ballistic missiles and space travel., and the
second half as development of ICBMs and the
start of the space age* Gen. Bernard
Schriever, who managed the Air Force's
missile developments during the 1950s* saw
'the decade as the golden age of advancing
rocket techno logy **? *
The decade began with space enthusiasts
apparently no closer to their goal than
1-18

before and with air-breathing propulsion
favored over rockets for long-range missiles. Weapons development and scientific interests, however, brought rapid
changes by mid-decade. The military
swung back to rocket missiles in 1953-54
when a breakthrough in thermonuclear
weapon development indicated that a much
smaller payload than heretofore thought
necessary about 700 kilograms would be
effective for strategic use. In 1954 the
Atlas ICBM was selected for intensive
development and within a year there were
two ICBMs and two intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM) under development
by the Air Force and Army. Funding jumped from $3 million in 1952-53 to $161
million in 1954-55 and continued to rise.
The stepped-up military missile development spurred space enthusiasts also. A
number of proposals and fascinating descriptions of things to come appeared in
technical meetings and the media. One of
the most noteworthy was the series of
articles in Colliers by von Braun and
others in 1952-54 which was later published as a book*' 8 ' On the technical side
were papers dealing with all aspects of
space transportation including not only
the vehicle with its propulsion, structure,
and guidance systems but also the hazards
man might experience in space such as
high accelerations at take-off, weightlessness, hard vacuum, meteorites, and
radiation. Attention to the return phase
of flight also increased; winged, rocketpowered vehicles were discussed independently by Nonweiler (1951), von Braun
(1952-54), Ehricke (1952-54). Romick
(1954), and Crocco (1954),^' Crocco entitled his paper "The Crucial Problem in
Astronautics:Recovery of Multistage Vehicles." He argued that economics dictated that each stage be a complete flying
machine capable of ascending into space
and returning safely to earth. His proposal of a step-by-step increase in
flight capability was reminiscent of
Valier and Tsiolkovskiy. The problem in
the mid-1950s, however, was that all the
big money and priority and hence technology were focused on expendable military missiles.

flight by pointing out its many problems
in an article in Life magazine:"Space, Its
Enough to Make the Blood Boil."(Life, Aug.
31. 1953). Among engineers who urged
caution in making overly optimistic space
proposals, was Milton Rosen, director of
the Viking sounding rocket program, who
knew the practical problems from firsthand experience. In several meetings, he
spoke on the "margin of error," where he
pointed out that small decreases in rocket
propellant flow or thrust could make big
differences between predicted and actual
performance. In 1955, he and von Braun
clashed puBlicly. The event was the second
symposium on space flight at the Hayden
Planetarium of the American Museum of
Natural History where von Braun was scheduled to present a step-by-step development
approach and Rosen was to follow with a
"down-to-earth" view. The coordinator,
Willey Ley, wanted to drop Rosen's paper
for fear that it would turn people away
from space flight, but von Braun took the
opposite view: a good argument would create
interest. He was right, for the session
made the front pages of New York news- J(10)
papers and the cover of Time magazine.

In the midst of all the mounting optimism
and effort to gain political and public
support for space flight, there were some
with a different view. One was Jonathan
Leonard, science editor of Time magazine,
who ridiculed the prospects of space
1-16

HELP FROM SCIENTISTS

In 1953, space advocates got a big break
when the use of satellites to study space
phenomena was recommended by a group of
scientists planning the International Geophysical Year (IGY) activities to start in
mid-1957. The idea of a satellite for
scientific research gained government acceptance and by mid-1955 both the Soviet
Union and the United States announced plans
for IGY satellites.
SPACE BECOMES AN ACCEPTABLE WORI)

The U.S. plans for a scientific satellite
were limited to a very modest effort and
included the development of a special
launch vehicle the Vanguard. The vehicle
development, managed by the Navy, was not
to interfere in any way with the high
priority military missile developments. In
fact, during the following years, emphasis
on missile development was so great that a
general anti-space attitude developed among
U.S. Government officials. Anyone proposing a government program that mentioned
space was inviting a budget cut. A typical
example of this attitude was Schriever's
experience after a talk he gave at a rocket

including Saturn, reflected their belief
in relatively heavy, massive structures.
The light Bossart tanks, however, were a
breakthrough in the problem of building
light vehicle structures and played an
important role later in gaining acceptance for the use of low-density liquid
hydrogen in upper stages.

meeting in San Diego in February 1957 in
which he mentioned that the missile program was creating a foundation for space.
The following day he received a telegram
from Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson
ordering him never to use the word"space"
again in any of his speeches. '^' This
attitude changed overnight, of course,
when Sputnik flew in October. By the time
of Sputnik there were six U.S. missiles
under development Jupiter, by the Army;
Polaris, by the Navy; and Thor, Atlas,
Titan, and Minuteman by the Air Force
and all were larger and had greater payload capability than the U.S. satellite
booster, Vanguard. Funding for the missiles was $1.3 billion in 1954-57 and was
still climbing. President Eisenhower and
the Department of Defense kept these missile programs strictly on surface-tosurface military requirements, much to the
disappointment of space enthusiasts.

LARGE ENGINES AND RELIABILITY

Although missiles received top priority,
the Air Force far-sightedly supported
R&D on larger engines, obviously with
manned space flight in mind. In 1955,
Rocketdyne received an Air Force contract
on the feasibility of an engine of 1.3
meganewtons (300,000 Ib thrust), the E-l,
but it was never built. The same year,
Rocketdyne announced that a single engine
developing 4.5 meganewtons (1 million Ib
thrust) was feasible. In 1956, a panel
of the Air Force's Scientific Advisory
Board recommended a study of engines of
22 meganewtons, far larger than any
currently planned. In 1958, the Air
Force awarded Rocketdyne a contract for
the preliminary design of a 4.5 meganewton engine, designated the F-l. Later
in the year, NASA took over the project,
increased the desired thrust to 6.7 meganewtons, and held another competition
which Rocketdyne won. A development
contract for the engine began in January
1959.

FEASIBILITY OF THIN-WALL TANKS

The first Atlas flew in 1957 and the
flight, generally regarded as a failure,
was really a great success for demonstrating the feasibility of Bossart 's thin-wall,
pressure-stabilized tanks incorporated in
the missile. During the first flight, the
exhaust flames severed a control cable in
the engine compartment causing the missile
to tumble violently while still in the
atmosphere. In spite of the very heavy
aerodynamic loads imposed on the tanks
and structure, they held a convincing
sight to many. Some engineers, however,
remained unconvinced and prominent among
them were members of von Braun's team at
the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) ,
who were as conservative in their designs
as bold in space proposals. Later, when
Atlas was selected for Mercury flights,
the ABMA engineers kidded Bossart: "My
God, John Glenn is going to ride in that
contraption? He should be getting a medal
just to sit on top of it before he takes
off.* Once, during a visit of ABMA
engineers to San Diego, Bossart and his
associates decided to show them just how
tough the Atlas skin was. They pressurized
a rejected Atlas tank and invited their
visitors to knock a hole in it with a
sledge-hammer. One tried and the instant
rebound of the hammer from the undamaged
surface narrowly missed taking an ear
off. * '' The ABMA engineers remained unconvinced about thin-wall, pressurestabilized tanks and all of their designs,

During the development of the ICBM and
other rocket engines during the 1950s,
a recurring problem was a phenomenon
called combustion instability or combustion pressure oscillations. These
oscillations greatly increased heat
transfer and quickly burned out normallycooled engines. A great amount of
research was done on combustion oscillations but general understanding remained limited. The ICBM, engines overcame this problem and became reliable,
but during F-l engine development in the
early 1960s the problem rose again. It
was eventually solved but combustion
instability was generally regarded, as one
of the biggest threats to reliability
during engine development, and testing.
HIGH ENERGY PROPELIAMTg

The first and, major liquid prope 11 ant
combination used in the IRBMs and ICBMs
1-1?

was jet fuel (kerosene)-liquid oxygen,
and performance was reasonably high.
During the 1950s, however, there was considerable interest in liquid propellants
capable of producing higher performance,
but none appeared suitable for military
missiles where readiness and logistics
were major factors. In 1950, researchers
at the NACA Lewis laboratory chose liquid
hydrogen as a promising high-energy fuel
and planned to extend the technology of
the 1940s, but research was hampered by
the lack of an adequate liquid hydrogen
supply. This problem was overcome by the
mid-1950s and experiments were conducted
on the regeneratively cooled engines of a
practical size. The laboratory's associate director, Abe Silverstein, became
enthusiastic about the potentiality of
using liquid hydrogen for high-altitude
aircraft as well as rockets. His familiarity with hydrogen from Lewis experiments with both rockets and aircraft was
to play an important role in a key decision
in late 1959, to be discussed later.
In a separate activity, Clarence Johnson,
famed aircraft designer, completed his
development of the U-2 and became interested in the possibility of using liquid
hydrogen in an advanced aircraft to surpass the U-2's altitude performance. He
proposed this to the Air Force in early
1956 and the Air Force became very interested. A special project was established
and over a hundred million dollars was
spent over the next two years on various
aspects of hydrogen fueled engines and
aircraft, including financing the construction of three sizeable hydrogen
liquefiers. Although liquid hydrogen
proved to be reasonably easy to handle,
Johnson became disillusioned over the aircraft 1 s range and logistic problems. The
project faded in 1958 but its Air Force
managers proposed to use the technology
and facilities to develop a hydrogenThis became the RL-10
fueled rocket.
engine developed by Pratt & Whitney and was
initiated in August 1958. Independent of
the Air Force's hydrogen aircraft project,
Krafft Ehricke proposed a hydrogen-oxygen
upper stage for Atlas for space applications. The proposal, made in late 1957,
was not selected for development until
August 1958. Powered by two RL-10 engines,
the Centaur became the first upper stage
to use liquid hydrogen-oxygen, the same
combination advocated by Oberth in the
1920so Like the Atlas, Centaur used
Bossart's thin-wall, pressure-stabilized
. 1-18

tanks sharing a common bulkhead and it
has been one of the most successful
stages in the space program.
During development of the hydrogen-oxygen
RL-10, combustion instability problems
were not encountered. The principal
engineer, Richard Mulready, independently
conceived the idea of operating the
hydrogen pump's ball bearings immersed in
liquid hydrogen. This was the same
concept shown to be feasible at Ohio State
University a decade earlier, indicating
once again that similar innovations spring
from more than one source.
TURMOIL AND ORDER. 1958-59

The 1958-59 period was one of great space
planning activity, competition among
government groups for a role in space,
and the emergence of the basic space
transportation "stable" of boosters that
has served the space program well. The
Russian space accomplishments in 1957-58
made it amply clear that their boosters
had greater space payload capability
than U.S. vehicles. There was a popular
outcry in the United States, aided and
abetted by space enthusiasts, to catch up
and surpass the Russians. Thus, foreign
competition, with attendant fears of
losing technological and defense advantages, did what years of previous space .
proposals had failed to do: gain political
and public support for more than a
minimal space program.
The low-budget, low-priority Vanguard
program was plagued with development
problems at the time of Sputnik, and in
November the Army was given permission to
prepare a back-up vehicle. The following
month turned out to be a low point for
U.S. space plans. After Sputnik, Vanguard
received the full glare of U.S. public
attention and the launch of its third
test vehicle in December was a disaster.
The von Braun team, who had been studying
large launch vehicles since 1956, chose
that month to submit an ambitious proposal
to the Department of Defense entitled
"A National Integrated Missile and Space
Development Program" but it received
Also in the same
little attention.
month, the Air Force made a move towards
a space role by establishing a directorate
of astronautics headed by Brig. Gen.
Homer Boushey, but it was abolished three
days later on curt orders from President

Elsenhower, then in Paris. Boushey had
the dubious honor of heading the shortestlived office in the Air Force. ( l The U.S space picture brightened in early
1958 with the successful launching of
Explorer I and Vanguard I. In this atmosphere of success, ABMA revised and resubmitted its proposal in March. It
listed eleven space boosters ranging from
the Vanguard and ABMA's Juno I to a
second generation orbital carrier of two
stages, both recoverable, with a payload
of 23,000 kilograms. The report became
enmeshed in a web of other space planning
activities. In February, the Department
of Defense established the Advanced
Research Projects Agency (ARPA) as the
focal point for all military space and
other advanced projects. In its initial
planning, ARPA included scientific satellites but in early April, this was changed
by Presidental directive; the NACA was to
become the nucleus of a new civilian space
agency proposed to Congress the same month.

of nine ICBM engines for the same total
thrust. The fifth generation included
larger vehicles 13 to 26 meganewtons,
with high-energy chemical and nuclear
upper stages. The same month, Silverstein,
a member of the Stever committee and von
Braun's working group, and head of NACA
space activities, submitted a rather
modest budget request for a start on the
booster program. Included were funds for
a large engine development, a cluster of
existing engines, and work on high-energy
chemical upper stages the latter for
unmanned flight.

While NACA was planning a space program,
ARPA had acquired an aggressive group of
experts who moved quickly towards large
boosters. One, Richard Canright, believed
that a cluster of existing ICBM engines
was the fastest way to build a large
booster and further, that multiple engines
would enhance reliability. Canright convinced the von Braun team of the value of
this approach rather than their favorite
design using four proposed E-l engines.
In August 1958, ARPA directed the Army and
In an earlier bid for a space role, NACA
ABMA to develop the first stage of a large
organized a space technology planning
booster using the multiple engines, first
committee headed by Dr. T. Guyford Stever.
called Juno V and later Saturn I. Also in
The committee organized seven working
August, as previously mentioned, ARPA
groups, on of which was on vehicles
headed by von Braun. In April, von Braun's directed the Air Force to start development
of a hydrogen-oxygen engine and the
eager staff jumped the gun on the working
Centaur upper stage for Atlas.
group by submitting an "interim" report
to the Stever committee that was essenIn January 1959, NASA and the Department
tially the same report, even to the title,
of Defense presented a joint report on a
as submitted earlier to the Department of
Defense. In addition to the space vehicles, national space vehicle program to the
National Aeronautice and Space Council and
the report proposed an ambitious space
the President. In the report, the current
program including a 50-man, permanent
vehicles Vanguard, Jupiter C, Juno II and
space station; flights to the moon; and
Thor-Able were criticized as being
interplanetary expeditions to Mars and
hurriedly assembled under pressure, not
Venus. When the report reached quiet,
very reliable, and not suitable for future
conservative NACA headquarters all hell
space needs. A series of general purpose
broke loose and the report quickly acquirvehicles, with an estimated useful life of
ed a tag forbidding it to leave the
5 years, were described: Atlas-Vega, Atlaspremises. ABMA asked permission to distribute the report but NACA gave permission Centaur, Juno V (Saturn I), and Nova. Two
other vehicles were mentioned, the allonly if each copy bore a disclaimer that
solid propellant Scout for small payloads
it was not an official NACA document. Von
and Atlas-Hustler fox military missions,
Braun soon got his working group together,
In the months to come, NASA dropped Atlashowever, and it included members from NACA
Vega in favor of Atlas-Centaur and the
the military, and industry. Their final
military replaced Atlas-Hustler with Atlasreport, in July, contained a vehicle
Agena.
program of 15 boosters in 5 generations
of development. The first three generJuno V, DoD's large vehicle, was shown
ations were based on on-going missile
with two configurations in the report,
developments. The fourth generation was
differing only in the third stage. The
ABMA's Juno V with four Rocketdyne E-l
initial third stage was to use keroseneengines developing 6.8 meganewtons, with
oxygen like the two lower stages but
an alternate configuration of a cluster
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He also questioned the need for Saturn in
view of the Air Force's plans for Titan C.
York was able to win Secretary of Defense
Neil McElroy to his view and he sent ARPA
a message that he was cancelling
Saturn.^ ' ARPA tried to save Saturn by
offering it to the Air Force but this did
not succeed. The remaining alternative
was to transfer Saturn to NASA which ABMA
had successfully resisted for some time
even though the transfer was favored by
both the Secretary of Defense and the "
President.

would be later replaced by a hydrogenoxygen stage using' the Pratt & Whitney
engines under development.
Nova was NASA's large vehicle concept
which would use four F-l engines in its
first stage and one in the second stage.
The third and fourth stages would use
hydrogen-oxygen engines. NASA saw Nova
as a means for transporting man to the
surface of the moon and returning him
safely to earth.
One of the problems facing government
planners was not so much a lack of ideas
for space transportation but how to select
the best, consistent with the overall objectives of the national space effort. In
this respect, the rest of 1959 was a turbulent period for large booster proposals
but the issues were resolved by the end
of the year.
Events during the spring and summer of
1959 were frustrating for military planners of large space boosters. Work proceeded at ABMA on the first stage of
Saturn I, but a decision could not be
reached on Saturn's upper stages, particularly after the Army began to consider the
Air Force's Titan as a second stage. The
Air Force wanted no part of this, for not
only would it divert some Martin effort
away from the Titan missile, it would also
bring the Army into its contractor territory.
The Air Force offered to manage the development of a Titan as a second stage for
Saturn but the Army wanted no part of that
arrangement. Another pertubation was Air
Force plans for a larger version of a
Titan, called Titan C, which would boost a
winged vehicle into a skip-glide path. This
was Dynasoar, the first U.S. project initiated for a manned winged vehicle for eventual flight into orbit and return.
While the intramural wrangling over Titan
as a second stage for Saturn was going on,
a much worse problem for Saturn arose. Dr.
Herbert York, newly appointed to the Department of Defense's highest position in research and development, began taking a
hard look at large boosters and military
space plans. He believed that even after
several years of effort the military had
not made a case for manned space flight.
He saw such flights as NASA's mission and
ABMA's emphasis on large booster development as seriously interfering with the
Army's primary mission of ground warfare.

1-20

York's critical assessment of the military
role in space forced an issue that had
been simmering for some time: how many
large space boosters could the Nation
afford to develop? York established a
review committee with himself and NASA's
Hugh Dryden as co-chairmen to consider
the three large boosters: the Army's
Saturn, the Air Force's Titan C, and
NASA's Nova. Agreement was quickly
reached that only one should be developed
and Saturn emerged as the winner. Titan
C was shelved and Nova was considered too
far in the future to be competitive with
Saturn. York agreed and began negotiating for the transfer of ABMA to NASA: in
October, President Eisenhower approved
the transfer by executive order.
Remaining unsettled after the selection
of Saturn was its upper stage configurations. ABMA abandoned its initial
proposal to use Titan as the second stage
when further study of the long, slender
configuration indicated severe structural bending load problems. A second
stage with a larger tank diameter than
Titan I but using Titan's engines was
proposed. NASA favored using hydrogenoxygen and pushed for the development of
a 668 kilonewton hydrogen-oxygen engine
that had been under study for some time.
This engine, with a higher thrust specified, was the J-2 and its development
started in early 1960.
In December 1959, with the issue of
Saturn's upper stages still unresolved,
NASA's Richard Horner appointed a NASADoD "team" headed by Silverstein to make
recommendations on Saturn upper stages
and a Saturn development plan. Von Braun,
a member of the team, initially argued
strongly for using tried and proven
kerosene-oxygen engines in the second
stage. Silverstein, however, was convinced not only from his own experience

and judgment but also by Saturn analyses
by Eldon Hall that all upper stages
should use liquid hydrogen-oxygen. This
was a very bold view at the time, for the
only project underway using hydrogenoxygen was Centaur and it was in the early
stages of development. Silverstein won
von Braun and others on the team to his
view and in mid-December the team recommended that the first and follow-on
Saturns use liquid hydrogen-oxygen in all
the upper stages.' ^' Also recommended was
a "building block" approach for upper
stages in which, for example, the second
stage of the first Saturn could be used
without modification as the third stage of
a larger, follow-on Saturn. The follow-on
Saturn turned out, after a number of configuration studies, to be Saturn V. Thus
the basic decision of the Silverstein
committee to use hydrogen-oxygen and the
development approach of multiple use of
stages were key factors in the timely
development, performance, and reliability
of Saturns I and V.
To sum up the 1950s, there were many
imaginative descriptions of space missions
and some realistic proposals. These
raised sparks of interest but not sufficient flame to support a project until
scientists provided the reason and motivation. The use of space for science
brought political and public acceptance
of a very modest space effort until
foreign competition stimulated a large
space program. Space transportation was
able to get a rapid start by using
missiles and technologies developed during
the decade. Competition between government
groups, coupled with political and public
will, became the crucible for ensuring the
emergence of a strong and sound program.
Innovations, such as those by Bossart, and
bold decisions, such as the one by
Silverstein to use hydrogen-oxygen in all
Saturn upper stages, allowed quantum jumps
in technology and the development of successful vehicles.
In conclusion, the lessons of the 1950s
can apply to future successful space
projects. They need the right mix of:
realistic proposals of what can be done
and the benefits to be derived, in order
to create enthusiasm and desire; timely
and realistic plans in tune with political,
economic, and social interests, to gain
acceptance; research and technology, to
make developments feasible, augmented by

innovations and bold, sound decisions if
needed to overcome major obstacles; sound
engineering and management, to develop
and fly reliable space vehicles; and life
support and protection systems to ensure
that astronauts can fulfill their role
during the mission.
REFERENCES

(1} Parts of this paper are based on research conducted by the author for a
larger study:Liquid Hydrogen as a Proulsion Fuel, 1945-195.?* to be published
by NASA.
(2) Sanger-Bredt, Irene,"The Silver Bird
Storv,"Spaceflight,v!5,n5, May 1973,p!66.
(3) F. Zwicky,"Report on Certain Phases of
War Research in Germany,"Report F-U-3RE,
Hq.AMC, Wright Field, Jan.1947 (NASA
History Office).
(4) R. Cargill Hall, "Early U.S. Satellite
Proposals," Technology & Culture 4(Fall
1963); J.C. Hunsaker,"Jet Propulsion,"an
address before the Nat. Academy of Sci.,
23 Apr. 1946 (NASA History Office).
(5) Hall, "Early U.S. Satellite Proposals;
(6) Interview with K.J. Bossart, La Jolla,
Calif., 27 Apr. 1974.
(7)Samuel K. Hoffman,"Rocket Engines of the
1950*s," and Gen. Bernard Schriever,"Thor,
Atlas, and Titan," AIAA Panel"Rocketry in
the 1950's,"Washington, 28 Oct. 1971,
NASA Historical Report 36; portions in
Astronautics and Aeronautics, vlO/nlO,
Oct. 1972.
( Q ) Colliers, Oct.25,1952,Feb.28,1953, Mar.
7, 1953;Mar. 14, 1953, Jun.27,1953; Apr.
30,1954? see also: Across the Space Frontier
ed. Cornelius Ryan, New York: Viking,1953.
(9) R.F. Nonweiler,"Descent from Satellite
Orbits Using Aerodynamic Braking" Jour.;T
British Interplanetary Soc.,v10,n6, Nov.
1951,p.258. Nonweiler's paper and those by
von Braun, Ehricke, Romick, and Crocco are
abstracted by Krull, Alan R.,"A History of
the Artificial Satellite/1 Jet Propu1sion,
v26,n5 Part 1, May 1956.
(10) "Second Symposium on Space Travel,"
Hayden Planetarium, Amer. Museum of Nat.
History, N.Y., Oct. 1953 ed. L.J.Carter,

1-21

Jour, Brit. Interplanetary Soc.,vl2,1953;
also remarks by von Braun and Rosen at
AIAA panel on "Rocketry in the 1950's,"
Washington, Oct. 28,1972, NASA Hist. Rep.
36.
(11) Remarks by Gen. Schriever at AIAA
panel on "Rocketry in the 1950*3."
(12) Interview with K.J. Bossart, La Jolla,
Calif.,27 Apr. 1974; group interview with
Grant Hansen, K.E. Newton, Deane Davis,
Donald Heald, and K.J. Bossart, Convair
Aerospace Div., General Dynamics, San
Diego, Calif., 29 Apr. 1974.
(13) Interview with Maj.Gen. Donald L. Putt,
USAF(ret),Atherton, Calif.,30 Apr.1974.
(14)Dr. Herbert F. York, UCLA, San Diego to
Dr. Eugene M. Emme, NASA, Washington, 10
June 1974; ARPA "Saturn Chronology," ARPA
Files, Federal Records Center, Suitland,
Md.(NASA History Office).
(15) "Report to the Administrator, NASA,on
Saturn Development Plan by Saturn Vehicle
Team,"15 Dec.1959 (NASA History Office).

1-22

